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NEGLIGENCE IN RELATION TO PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
It is a paradox of the legal science that its fundamental principles
need restriction,; we are loath to see many of them carried to their
logical conclusion. With fettered truths a lawless science is created.
In no branch of the law is this better illustrated than in an attempt to
define the limits of responsibility for negligence. Sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non laedas, is a basic rule of conduct which none will question;
to what extent is it a duty?
Although the broader principles of such a question are covered in
a discussion of proximate cause, an examination of liability. for negli-
gence in relation to privity of contract, apart from the larger field,
offers a specimen perhaps unequalled elsewhere of the truth of the par-
adox.
As a general rule, it is laid down that an action for injuries resulting
from negligence in respect to a subject-matter which is covered by a
(607]
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contract cannot be maintained by a stranger to that contract.: This
arbitrary doctrine may be an unfortunate legacy bequeathed to us by the
old technicalities as to the forms of action. 2  That it is unfortunate is
indicated by the struggle which the courts have made to escape from
it; they have thrust so many exceptions through it that a recent attempt
to annihilate it altogether may prove successful.
The defendants had been engaged by a vendor of beans to weigh a
quantity which they knew the plaintiff had bought and had contracted
to pay for according to their certificate of weight. The defendants
negligently certified the weight to be more than it actually was, and the
plaintiff, in consequence, overpaid the vendor. He then brought an
action of tort for negligence, and was allowed to recover, on the ground
that he had suffered an injury caused by the defendants' negligence.
Glanzer v. Shepard (192o, App. Div.) 186 N. Y. Supp. 88.
The court boldly took the analogy of a dangerous instrumentality
and arrived at an extreme result.3 But is there anything anomalous
in a rule which imposes upon A, who has contracted with B, a duty to
C when he knows the subject-matter is intended for C's use?4 When
anyone of reasonable foresight is so placed with regard to another that
he recognizes that his negligence in the matter is not unlikely to cause
injury to the other party, should not a duty exist for him to use ordinary
care to avoid such a danger?- The instant case is practically unique
in so holding,6 and no other form of action against the present defen-
'Labatt, Negligence in Relation to Privity of Contract (I900) 16 LAW QUAR.
REv. 168; 2 Cooley, Torts (3d ed. i9o6) 1486; 38 Cyc. 433; see discussion of
general rule in NoTas (igo2) I5 Harr. L. REv. 666.
'See Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts (i9o5) 53 Am. L.
REG. 214-220. Winterbottom v. Wright (1842, Exch.) io M. &. W. io9, is the
traditional leading case on this phase of the law and started the tendency which
grew into a rule. Lord Abinger remarked, "There is . . . a class of cases in
which the law permits a contract to be turned into a tort; but ... they are all
cases in which an action might have been maintained on the contract." The
case does not really stand for the proposition supposed, as it turned on a ques-
tion of pleading.
'MacPherson v. Buick Co. (1916) 217 N Y. 382, 11I N. E. io5o, is the only
case cited by the court and its entire reliance is upon its reasoning. Cardozo,
J., in his decision there said, "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing
of danger." The article in question was an automobile wheel. "If to the. ele-
ment of dahger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used. by persons
other than the purchaser, then irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this
thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. That is as far as we are
required -to go for a decision of this case." See discussion in NoTvs (i916) 29
HARv. L. REv. 866; (I916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 679.
' See MacPherson v. Buick Co., supra note 3: "We have put aside the notion
that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence
may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the
source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the
law ."
' See Heaven v. Pender (1833) i1 Q. B. 503, 509. This dictum by Brett, M. R.,
was not concurred in by the rest of the court.Le Lilvre v. Gould [1893] I Q. B. 491, is directly contra-to the instant
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dant can be suggested.7 The English courts had struggled with 
a
nearly identical state of facts, the lower court allowing a recovery, but
the principle was apparently repudiated before an appeal was brought.$
If a presumption of validity is granted to the general rule, recognized
exceptions expose its extraordinary vulnerability when it is 
hard
pressed by the demands of natural justice and customary responsibility.
"Privity of contract" is of course the concept about which the battle
rages. No doubt it was a current view that if A had made a contract
with B, its operative effect was limited to legal relations between A and
B, and that it excluded or limited any liability of A to C, apart from
a contractual duty, arising out of an act which as between A and 
B was
case. See discussion in (1893) 7 Hav. L. REv. 124. Three cases have been
found which are apparently in accord, but their authority for the present decision
is weakened because they involve either physical injury or defamation. George
v. Skivington (i86g)' L. R. 5 Exch. 5 (B bought hair-wash of A, stating that.
it was to be used by X. A negligently represented that the liquid was fit for use
on the hair. X used the wash, suffering physical injury, and was allowed'to
recover against A) ; Harriott v. Plinpton (1896) 166 Mass. 585, 44 N. E. 992
(A, a physician, being employed by B to examine C, the plaintiff, negligently
reported that C had a certain disease, which in fact he did not have. C recov-
ered against A); Edwards v. Lamb (1899) 69 N. H. 599, 45 Atl. 43o (A, a
physician, was employed by B, and negligently advised C that it would be safe
for C to attend B. C was infected by B and recovered from A). See Smith,
Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14 HARv L. REV. 184, where these cases
are cited as instances of the author's theory of negligent misrepresentation as a
basis for tort liability. The instant case is perfectly covered by this doctrine,
the essentials of which are: (i) Defendant knows his statement will be com-
municated to plaintiff. (2) The statement is not true in fact. (3) Defendant,
though believing the statement, had no reasonable ground for such belief.
(4) Defendant made the statement with the intention that plaintiff should act
on it. (5) The subject-matter was such that one who acted in reliance upon it
would be likely to incur substantial pecuniary loss if statement were incorrect
(6) Plaintiff acted in reasonable reliance upon the statement. (7) Plaintiff
was damaged by so acting. See Houston z. Thornton (1898) 122 N. C. 365, 29
S. E. 827, imposing liability for negligent misstatement without privity of con-
tract Discussed in (1898) 12 HARV. L. Rlv. 221. Some few states have reached
this same result by "conclusively presuming" knowledge where truth ought to
have been known, and so finding fraud. Watson v. Jones (1899) 41 Fla. 241, 25
So. 678; Cotzhausen v. Simon (1879) 47 Wis. 103.
"An action for deceit would not lie. Derry v. Peek (1889) L. R. 14 A. C. 337.
Its general interpretation, that an action of deceit based on fraud cannot be
supported by proof of negligent misrepresentation, is followed in New York.
Marsh v. Fuller .(1869) 4o N. Y. 562. See full discussion of doctrine by Sir
Frederick Pollock in (1889) 5 LAW QU.. REV. 410.
8 Cann v. Wilson (1887) L. R. 39 Ch. 39; see (1889) 2 H,Iav. L. REV. 389. The
solicitors of the plaintiff, the intending mortagee of the property, required the
owner to obtain a valuation of it. The latter employed the defendant to do
so, who, knowing the purpose for which the valuation was to be used, carelessly
fixed a value. The plaintiff, in accordance with the representations of the
defendant, advanced money upon. the security of a mortgage. The plaintiff was
allowed to recover the amount of the damage he sustained from the great over-
valuation. Overruled by Derry v. Peek, supra note 9. See 2o Halsbury, Laws
of England, 665, note.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
a breach of contract.9 Such a view is no longer tenable.10 The real
question between A and C is one of general duty and reasonable care;
a relationship arising from A's acts and position with regard to C, not
from A's promises to B, although perhaps it may be due to them. A's
liability to C is not based upon his broken contract with B. "Proximate
"cause" and the recognized rules of responsibility for negligent acts
should replace a fetish of "privity of contract."
This the courts are recognizing in extending the scope of exceptions
to the general rule. The negligence of a manufacturer or vendor immi-
nently dangerous to life or health, committed in the preparation or
sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy; or affect Human life,
is actionable by third parties who suffer.1" Negligence which causes
injury to one who is "iftvited" to use a defective appliance may form
the basis of an action against the manufacturer, although the article
has passed from the defendant's possession and the harm arises purely
from a remote use. 12  One who sells or delivers an article known to
be imminently dangerous to life or limb without giving notice Lf its
qualities is responsible for ensuing injuries regardless of any contrac-
tual relationship."3 These are the more apparent and general excep-
tions. In addition there is a myriad of decisions involving in essence
the matter under discussion but disguised as cases of "implied warran-
"ties."' 14  We might so disguise the instant case, and by plausible anal-
ogy find many cases in accord. We are bordering quite obviously
upon the question of whether a third party beneficiary to a contract
may sue for its negligent performance. Was the present plaintiff
See i6 LAw Qu a. REv. 39O, note by the editor. See Anson, Contract
(Corbin's ed. 1919) 335.
See notes, post.
"Sde Bohlen, op. cit. note 2. Thomas v. Winchester (1852) 6 N. Y. 397, is theleading case. See discussion and authorities cited in Huset v. Case (i9o3,C. C. A. 8th) i2O Fed. 865. See cases collected in 9 "L. R." A. (N. s.) 923, and
48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 213.
",This is .an obligation to take care that appliances supplied for use for the
purpose of the business of the person supplied should be safe therefor. Heaven
-v. Pender, supra note 5; Elliott v. Hall (x885) L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 3r5; Hayes
v. Coal & Iron Co. (1889) i5o Mass. 457, 23 N. E. 225; Sweny v. Rozell (1yoo,
_Sup. Ct.) 31 Misc. 64o, 64 N. Y. Supp. 721; Roddy v. R. R. (i8gi) 3O4 Mo. 234.
45 S. W. i1; Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co. (x9i8, Ind.) 118 N. E. 693; dis-
cussed in (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 691.
"Langridge v. Levy (1837, Exch.) 2 M/{. & W. 519; Wellington v. Downer(i87o) IO4 Mass. 64; Lewis v. Terry (1896) III Calif. 39, 43 Pac. 398. See
Blagdon v. Perkins-Campbell Co. (i898, C. C. A. 3d) 87 Fed. iog, for extensive
discussion of cases in support of the three exceptions listed above. See Wood v.
Sloan (i915) 20 N. M. 127, 148 Pac. 5o7: "Certain exceptions to the general
rule . . . exist, and they may be divided into two classes, viz. (I) Those where
the thing dealt with is imminently dangerous in kind; and (2) those where the
thing dealt with is not imminently dangerous in kind, but is rendered dangerous
by defect."
"See discussion and collection of cases in COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 782. The American cases are based in tort. See also CoMMETzrs(i918) 27 id., 961.
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intended as such a party ?"5 The answer is not so obvious as on 
first
impression it may appear. 6 Perhaps the nearest analogy to the present
case is where a defendant has negligently prepared an abstract 
of title
and a plaintiff not in privity has been damaged. This situation 
has
been dealt with in many cases, the weight of authority being that 
the
responsibility extends only to the persons by whom the abstracter 
was
employed.1" There must be a contract or privity of contract, since 
no
relief may be had in tort."" But where the abstracter was aware 
that
the plaintiff was being served, a number of recent decisions have recog-
nized a cause of action without any privity whatever,
0 and a larger
" See Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed. igg) 345: "In order that a third party
may sue upon a contract made by others he must show that he was 
intended by
them to have an enforceable right or at least that the performance 
of the con-
tract must necessarily be of benefit to him and such benefit must have 
been within
the contemplation and purpose of the contracting parties." He cites many 
cases
in illustration of his point. Curiously enough, the case most closely analogous 
to the
one under discussion is a Massachusetts decision, a jurisdiction where the rule is
not avowedly recognized. Phinney v. Boston EI.Co. (gog) 2o Mass. 286,87 N. E.
490: "The contract with the city, whereby the defendant undertook 
to relieve the
city of the performance of its statutory duty, brought the defendant into 
a rela-
tion to those travellers which was the foundation of a legal obligation to provide
for their safety."
"The water company cases are nearly in point, where a water company has
contracted with a municipality to maintain a certain supply of water for putting
out fires and has failed to do so, with resulting injury to a citizen's property.
The gdneral rule undoubtedly denies recovery, chiefly for lack of privity, follow-
ing the leading case of Nickerson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. (1873) 47 Conn.
24; see Corbin, Liability of Water Companies (igo) 19 YALE LAW JoURNAL,
425, where the cases are collected and the-possible liability in tort 
is also con-
sidered. The courts of Kentucky, North Carolina, and Louisiana take a directly
contrary view and allow recovery without privity. See (i9o5) 3 Micn. L. Rnv.
445. Individual citizens are generally allowed to sue transportation companies
and other public service companies on contracts made with the municipality.
See 49 L, R. A. (N. s.) 1166, note. But see note by A. M. Kales in (19o7) i9
GREEN BAG, 130: "The difficulty in this class of cases is the opportunity which
is offered to a court, swayed by sentiment and sympathy, of making a special rule
for particular case contrary to a general rule of the greatest fundamental import-
ance, and by way of infringement upon the peculiar province of the legislature."
And in (19o) 3 MicH. L. REV. 518: "Was there ever a more monstrous excep-
tion to the general rule?"
17 1 Cyc. 215; I C. J. 369. See doctrine adversely criticized in Noms (igo8)
21 HARv. L. REv. 439.
"See Thomas v. Guarantee Title Co. (I91O) 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N. E. 183.
Brown v. Sims (1899) 22 Ind. 317, 53 N' E. 779; Western Loan C. v. Silver
Bow Abstract Co. (904) 31 Mont. 448, 78 Pac. 774; Economy Bldg. Assoc. v.
West Jersey Title Co. (i899, Sup. Ct.) 64 N. J. L. 27, 44 Atl. 854; Denton v.
lashville Title Co. (i9o3) 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S. W. 799; Dickle v. Nashville
Abstract Co. (1890) 89 Tenn. 531, 14 S. W. 896; Anderson v. Spriestersbach
(19i:2) 69 Wash. 393, i25 Pac. 166. In the last case, in discussing the general
rule, it was said: "This rule is sustained by the weight, considered in numbers,
of authority; but we are not willing to apply it, unless it is plain that there was
no duty on the part of the abstracter to the party injured. . . . He knew that
the trade, if made at all, would be made upon the faith of his certificate." See,
contra, in regard to certified public accountants, Sandell v. Lybrand (i919) 264
Pa. 406, 1o7 At!. 783; criticized in (192o) 29 YAL. LAW JouRNAT, 234.
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number have strained the doctrine of privity to unusual extremes.21
The struggle is again significant.21
The courts have thus outgrown the recognized exception of danger-
ous instrumentalities. 22 The law has been moving fast toward just
such a decision as the present, but the cases have moved on parallel
lines and the busy judge has not had the time to correlate them. A
cursory survey will disclose the coming orthodoxy of a rule so foreign
to its prototype that a new day is upon us before we are aware of the
dawn. The instant case may be reversed without affecting the progress
of its imperative, analogies. The principle is of to-morrow and its
importance is far reaching. judges have long expatiated upon the
withering effects of such extensions of liability,23 but their instincts
of justice are destroying the terrors of their logic.
The business of furnishing information has stood on a different
plane than all others, and those engaged in it have owed no duty to
any save those who personally employed them. Apparently that is all
that is still intact of a once sweeping rule; the decision under discus-
sion is indeed significant.
'0Murphy v. Fidelity Abstract Co. (1921, Wash) 194 Pac. 591. The cases cited
in the decision are illustrative.
' See its first beginning in Savings Bank v. Ward (1879) IoO U. S. I95. A,
an attorney, employed solely by B, made out a negligent opinion on title to cer-
tain land. C, with whom A had no contract, relied upon the certificate as true,
and loaned money to B, who was insolvent. The court held that C should not
recover, but Chief Justice Waite, and Swayne and Bradley, J.J., dissented.
Sometimes, however, doing lip service by considering such articles as "pop
bottles" to be "inherently dangerous." See Johnson v. Cadilac Motor Car Co.
(292o, C. C. A. 2d) 261 Fed. 878, where they are classed with "poisons, dynamite,
gunpowder, and torpedoes." (192o) 5 IowA L. BULL. 6, 86, has full discussion
of this aspect, as well as of the food cases. A cake of soap has been held to be
an "intrinsically dangerous article." Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co. (9o9) 139
Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157; Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem (1912, Tex. Civ. App.)
151 S. W. 576.
" In Winterbottom v. Wright, supra note 2, Lord Abinger remarked: "If the
plaintiff can sue, every passenger or even any person passing along the road,
who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action.
Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can
see no limit, would ensue." See, to practically the same effect, Collis v. Selden
(1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 495, and practically all cases denying such relief. It has
been suggested, for instance, that the doctrine would permit a disappointed legatee
to sue the testator's lawyer for negligence in not causing a will to be duly
attested. See Robertson v. Fleming (1861) 4 Macq. H. L. 167. In (1907) 19
GpmEN'BAG 131, Mr. Kales, speaking of the majority rule, said: "It is so obvious
that it hardly needs extended comment. Any departure from it would make
every sort of human activity, whether founded upon contract or tort, highly
speculative in character. The amount of liability which might be incurred for
the failure to perform any obligation would remain uncertain and too frequently
incalculable. An infinity of suits must not infrequently ensue upon the breach
of an obligation." For a disposal of these objections, see (igoo) 16 LAw Qu.p-
Ray. i86.
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POSSESSION AND CUSTODY IN THE LAW OF LARCENY
An investigation of the modern law of larceny gives an impression
of utter confusion, a field for the courts to exercise their abilities in
making fine, technical, and narrow distinctions. Frequently it appears
to be largely a matter of guess-work as to whether or not the offense
committed is larceny, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pre-
tenses, or some other form of statutory offense created by the legisla-
ture in a vain attempt to fill up some loop-hole in the existing laws.
Without a study of the early common law and its development this
confusion is inexplicable.
A recent case in one of the English police courts, (192o, Westmin-
ster Pol. Ct.) 84,JusTIcE OF THE PEACE, 5o8, illustrates the difficulties
involved in the subject. An employee of the London General Omni-
bus Company was discharged; at the time of her dismissal the company
had demanded the return of a staff pass issued to her, which she claimed
to have lost. Later she was found travelling with the pass, and was
accused of stealing it, as bailee.
From early times a fundamental characteristic of the offense of lar-
ceny has been the trespassory taking from the owner.1 The act had
to be done animo furandi and invito domino.2 It can therefore readily
be seen that the common-law definition, if accurately construed, would
not include cases dealing with -the misappropriation of property by
bailees or servants, nor would it include cases of wrongful acquisition
of property by fraud or artifice. The present confusion in the law is
due to the attempts of the courts and the legislative bodies to provide
for the punishment of such offenses as seem not to be covered by the
common law.
One of the first qualifications found necessary was some provision for
holding bailees who fraudulently misappropriated property entrusted
to them. Accordingly, in 1473, the Court of Star Chamber decided
that, if a bailee, in violation of the terms of his bailment, "breaks bulk,"
the bailment is terminated and the subsequent conversion of a part of
the property is the felonious taking constituting the crime of larceny s
This decision created an anomalous situation, in that, when the entire
object was converted, there was no larceny, but when *part only was
converted, there was larceny.. This distinction is obviously unsound,
and probably the original decision was the result of a compromise to
'Joseph H. Beale, The Borderland of Larceny (i8gz) 6 HARV. L. REv. 244.
For various early definitions of larceny see 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal
Law (1883) 129.
"Larceny is the treacherously taking away from another moveables corporeal,
against the will of him to whom they do belong, by evil getting of the possession,
or the use of them." Mirrours of Autices, 3r.
'See (1894) '28 an. L. T". 290; reprinted in (z894) 27 CHL LEG. NEws, ioi.
'The Carrier's Case (x473) Y. B. 13 Edw. IV, p. 9, pl. 5; reported also in Pol-"
tock & Wright, Possession in the Common Law (i888) 134.
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propitiate the Lord Chancellor;' nevertheless it is still recognized as
law.5 Many states, however, have enacted statutes which make the
misappropriation of property by a bailee larceny whether or not there
has been a breaking of bulk.8
In 1779 the doctrine of larceny by trick was introduced by Pearls
Case,7 which held that if a person obtains the delivery of a thing by
fraud, artifice, or trick, intending at the time to convert it, such a taking
is larceny. This decision, which really only followed the precedent set
by the Carrier's Case,' introduced a highly burdensome qualification
which has clogged the courts with subtle questions only determinable
by juggling the terms "possession" and "custody" to meet the needs
of the particular case. To convict the accused of larceny, the court held
that, since the original intent was fraudulent, the contract was a mere
pretense and that the possession remained unaltered in the true owner at
the time of the conversion. The courts still continue to follow the
reasoning of this decision9 and have even developed it in some cases to
include installment contracts, in which they hold that the title does not
pass until the whole contract is performed on both sides.10
In 1779 Bazeley's Case"' caused the enactment of the English embez-
zlement statute'12 intended to cover cases dealing with the misappro-
' Stephen, op. cit. note i, at pI 139.
'Reg. v. Poyser (I851) 5 Coxc. G C. 24i; State v. Ruffin (1913) 164 N. C. 416,
79 S. E. 317; CoMMENrs (1916) 4 CAUIF. L. REv. 341. See also 2 Wharton,
Criminal Law (iith ed. I912) sec. 12o8.
'Crim. Code Ill. 1874, sec. I7o, applied in ,Bergman v. People (I898) i77 Ill.
244, 52 N. E. 363; Penal Code N. Y. 188i, sec. 528, applied in In re McFarland
(18gi, Sup. Ct.) 59 Hun, 304, I3 N. Y. Supp. 22.
See Burns v. State (I91I) 145 Wis. 373, 128 N. W. 987, applying Wis. St. i898,
sec 4415: Whoever being bailee of any chattel. . . shall fraudulently take... the
same . . . although he shall not break bulk or otherwise determine the bail-
ment, shall be guilty of larceny." See also 20 & 21 Vict. c. 54, sec. 4 (1857);
In re Wakeman (1912) 8 Cr. App. 18; (1874) 38 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 194,
which shows how strictly the courts have construed the English statute.
'Rex v. Pear (1779) I Leach C. L. 253, 2 East P. C. 685 (prisoner hired a
horse, ostensibly to take a journey, promising to return the horse that same
evening; subsequent conversion of the horse held -to be larceny).
'Carrier's Case, supra note 3. See Beale, op. cit, 6 HAav. L. REv. 25o: "The
decision is an application of the rule established, or. supposed at that time to
have been established, by the Carrier's Case, the only other authority cited by the
court."
'People v. Miller (19o2) 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418;. State v. Fitzsimmons
(i918) 3o Del. 152, 1o4 AtI. 338; People v. Rae (1885) 66 Calif. 423, 6 Pac. i;
Williams v. State (i9o5) 65 Ind. 472, 75 N. E. 875.
See also People v. Mills Sing (1919, Calif. App.) 183 Pac. 865, for a rather
extreme application of the principle.
"Regina v. Russett [1892] 2 Q. B. 312.
" Rex v. Bazeley (1799) 2 Leach C. L. 973. A bank clerk received a Lioo
note to put to the credit of a customer and converted it to his own use. The
court held this to be a mere breach of trust and not a felony, for the bank never
had possession.
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priation of property by servants and clerks. It was impossible to dis-
tort the common-law doctrine of larceny to cover these cases where the
property misappropriated had never even come into the master's pos-
session, but had been converted by the servant by virtue of his employ-
ment. This statute has been adopted in substantially the same form in
the United States18 and re-enacted in England,
1
' although the offense
now is usually extended to include all cases of taking by bailees and
other persons in a confidential relationship to the principal who have
a rightful possession.-
Under the old common-law doctrine many cases arose where the
owner delivered property to his servant to be dealt with in the course of
his employment. In the Carrier's Case16 the court in a dictum seemed
inclined to hold that in such cases a subsequent conversion by the
servant would be larceny. This was reconsidered in 1488,1? but shortly
thereafter a statute was enacted making this sort of misappropriation
a felony.18 Since that time the courts have consistently so ruled on the
theory that the servant has custody only, the possession being in the
master up to and at the time of the conversion.19 When the crime of
embezzlement was first created these cases were clearly distinguishable,
1" 39 Geo. III, c 85 (1799). This -statute enacted that if any clerk or servant
should, by virtue of his employment, receive or take into his possession any chat-
tel, money, or valuable security for, or in the name of, or on account- of his
master, and should fraudulently embezzle the same, he should be deemed to have
feloniously stolen the same from his master, although such chattel, money, or
security was not received into the possession of the master otherwise than by the
actual possession of the offender.
See also Noms (1916) s CALIF. L. Rv. 73, distinguishing Larceny and Embez-
zlement and stating the so-called doctrine of "ultimate destination."
" Calif. Penal Code igo3, sec. 5o8; Mass. Gen. St. i86o, ch. x61, sec. 38.
24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, sec. 68 (i86i) ; see also Larceny Act, xi6, sec. 17 (0.
See (192o) 2D Cox. L. REV. 318, 32o; See also Sykes v. State (i91p, Fla.) 8z
So. 778; .Bivens v. State (1912) 6 Okla. Cr. App. 52, i2o Pac. 1o33; Campos V.
State (igi8, Tex. Cr. App.) 2o7 S. W. 93r1; Moore v. United States (1895) i6o
U. S. 268, 16 Sup. Ct. 294.
16 Carrier's Case, supra note 3. IT (1488) Y. B. 3 Hen. VII, p. 12, pl. 9.i21 Hen. VIII c. 7 (529), providing that a servant who converts goods
delivered to 'him by 'his master shal be guilty of a felony and punishable as other
felons by the course of the common law.
12 East P. C. 564; Aabel v. State (i91o) 86 Neb. 7H1, 77, 126 N. W. 316, 319;
People v. Kawananakoa (1p18) 37 Calif. App. 433, 174 Pac. 686; Bonatz v. State
(i919) 85 Tex. Cr. App. 292, 212 S. W. 494; Chanock v. United States (x920,
App. D. C.) 267 Fed. 612.
See Pollock and Wright, op. cit. note 3, at p. 138: "Here it was once thought
the possession passed to the servant, at any rate when the charge was to be exe-
cuted away from the master, and particularly when the thing was not to be kept,
but to be delivered absolutely to a third person; but it has long been settled that
in all such cases the master's possession continues. The servant is said to have
not the possession but a mere charge (onus) or custody." See authorities cited
in text.
See also L. R. A. 1918 A, 38, note.
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but under some of our modem statutes a misappropriation may be either
larceny at common law or embezzlement under the statute, or vice
versa.
20
There is one more important group of cases, that which deals with the
obtaining of property by false pretenses. This offense very closely
,resembles larceny by trick. The distinction between the two is based
entirely on the question of possession, the courts holding the misappro-
priation to be larceny where the owner intended to part with the tem-
porary possession only, and obtaining by false pretenses where the
owner intended to part with his entire title to the property by reason
of the defendant's misrepresentations.2' This is another offense which
the courts could not include in the common-law definition of larceny
without entirely doing away with the basic requirement of a trespassory
taking. An English statute was enacted in 1757 making this offense
a misdemeanor. 22 The distinction above given between larceny and
obtaining by false pretenses is the one generally accepted as the better
view,23 but the courts have confused the issue by extending the offense
of obtaining by false pretenses to include cases where the title never
passed to the accused at all, the intention of the owner being to use him
as a mere conduit or means of conveying the property to a third party.2'
Such a misappropriation is really larceny.25
It has been pointed out ra.ther forcefully that the existence of the sub-
tle distinctions in these crimes is largely "due to accidental, historical
"State v. Taberner (1883) 14 R. I. 272, holding that the offense could be lar-
ceny either under the statute or at common law. The statute provided that
embezzling by a clerk or servant of property entrusted to him constituted larceny.But other courts -hold that one cannot be convicted under such a statute, on anindictment for larceny at common law, and that, in order to convict the accused
under these statutes, the indictment must show acts of embezzlement and aver
thitt the accused so committed his act of larceny. Kibs v. People (1876) 8i IL.
599; State v. Harmon (891) lo6 Mo. 635, 18 S. W. 128; Commonwealth v.Doherty (1879) 127 Mass. 2o.
', See 2 East P. C. 668: "The next inquiry is whether the owner, in making the
delivery, intended to part with the property, or only with the possession of thething delivered. For if he parted with the property to the prisoner, by whateverfraudulent means he was induced.to give the credit, it cannot be felony."
See also, i Bishop, Criminal Law (8th ed. 1892) secs. 583-586; 3 Stephen,
op. cit.. note I, i6o.
=30 Geo. II c 24, sea i (1757). See also 33 Hen. VIII c. i (1541) making the
obtaining of goods by false tokens a misdemeanor.
'Rex v. Pear, supra note 7; Williams v. State (i9o5) 165 Ind. 472, 75 N. E.875, 2 L. R. A. (x. s.) 249, note; People v. Miller, supra note 9; People v. Mills
Sing, supra note 9. k
But see Rex. v. Sanders [igg, Cr. App.] i K. B. 550, for an extreme case, held
to be false pretenses.
"Zink v. People (1879) 77 N. Y. i14; Rex. v. Coleman (1785) 2 East P. C.
672.
See Beale, op. cit. 6 HARv. Rav. 254, showing the existing confusion in the
application of the distinction.
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"causes" and that their continuance is entirely unnecessary. 26 These
criticisms are merited and the legislatures are gradually coming to rea-
lize the necessity of action. New York has endeavored to meet the sit-
uation by consolidating the offenses into one crime of larceny ;27
England has adopted similar measures which have worked out even
more effectively ;2' but the best results have been obtained in Massachu-
setts, where the existing statutes appear to have solved all difficulties.
2 9
Here the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining property by
false pretenses are consolidated as in New York and a further provision
is made so that an indictment for larceny "may be supported by proof
"that the defendant committed larceny of property, or embezzled it,
"or obtained it by false pretenses." This legislation, as indicated by the
decisions of the court, appears to meet the requirements."0 It is to be
hoped that the legislative bodies in other states will soon follow the lead
of Massachusetts and do away with the present cumbersome and anti-
quated 'laws which have now for so long needlessly perplexed the
courts and retarded justice.2 1
Novas (914) 2 CAmF. L. REV. 334. See also 3 Stephen, op. cit. note 1, at p.
158, for full explanation of Ithe development of the law of larceny. "... These
provisions contain the present law as to -criminal breaches of trust They consti-
tute a series of exceptions to the old common lawso wholly inconsistent with its
principle as to make it at once unintelligible and, so far as it still exists, a niere
incumbrance and source of intricacy and confusion."
24 N. Y. Cons. Laws 1909, 2696. People v. Brenneauer (1917, Sup. Ct) 101
Misc. 156, 166 N. Y. Supp. 8oi: "Since the adoption of the Penal Code it has
been repeatedly held that an indictment charging larceny in the common-law
form is not supported by proof showing the ciime of larceny by false pretenses or
by what formerly constituted the crime of larceny by false pretenses or by what
formerly constituted the crime of embezzlement"
'The Larceny Act, 1916. See also 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96 (1861) and authorities
in note 6, supra.
There appear to be no recent English cases which disclose how effectively the
1916 statute will operate. Sections 1, 17, 32, and 4o are especially interesting for
the purposes of this comment.
The principal case would seem to be correctly decided under section i.
"Rev. Laws Mass. 19o2, ch. 208, sec. 26; ch. 218, sec. 40. See also ch. 218,
sec. 39, providing that defendant may order the prosecution to file a bill of parti-
culars so as to inform him more fully of the nature ind grounds of the crime
charged. This provision meets the objection that these consolidation statutes
fail to protect the right of the defendant to be fully informed of the accusation.
" Commonwealth v. Kelley (903) 184 Mass. 320, 68 N. E. 346; Commonwealth
v. McDonald (i9o5) 187 Mass. 581, 584, 73 N. E. 852, 853: "But since this enact-
ment it has been unnecessary to state the fiduciary relation existing between a
defendant and the person entitled to the property embezzled, or to allege that the
defendant to whom it has been entrusted converted it to his own use, for the
crime of larceny under this statute includes the criminal appropriation of prop-
erty where no trespass, or fraud which has been held equivalent to trespass, in
obtaining its possession appears."
'For ar excellent summary of this problem with references to modern statutes
see NovEs (92o) 20 Co. L. REa. 318.
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PRESENT DAY LABOR LITIGATION
The extent to which contractual relations enter into the various
phases of labor litigation makes it advisable that they be .discussed
separately. In the preceding. comments' questions involving contrac-
tual relations were expressly excluded. Where one party to a dispute
violates a contractual obligation, to what extent does this modify the
general rules suggested previously? This question is of particular
importance at this time because of the recent extension of collective
bargaining'and the tendency to settle all labor questions by contract.
The primary situation is that in which the A employees strike against
their employer B in violation of their contract of employment. Once
the existence of a contract between A and B is proved, it follows that
the violation of that contract is wrongful. It is true that it is difficult
at times to determine the remedy to be applied, as will be taken upbelow, but still there seems to be unanimity of opinion that B should
have a remedy.2 If it is held otherwise, there would be but little benefit
to A and B in governing their relations in this manner.
A more difficult situation arises, however, when a third person causes
a breach -of contractual obligations. This is now generally recognized
as a tort when such third person is aware of the contract and intends to
bave one of the parties break it.3 Where force or fraud is used, of
course, it is everywhere a tort,4 and we shall therefore exclude such
1 COMENTS (192) 30 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 280, 404, 50i.
"In cases of persons under a contract to work, a strike or combination not to
work, in violation of that contract, to secure something not due them under the
contract, would be a combination interfering without justification with the
employers' business." Reynolds v. Davis (1go8) 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457.
In Nederlandsch Amer. S. M. v. Stevedores' & L. B. Soc. (i92o, E. D. La.) 265Fed. 397, the union employees quit againt the advice of their officers, and told Bhe could employ non-union men. The court said "The contract is inartificially
drawn and in terms imposes no obligation on respondents to furnish labor. It
must be given a reasonable construction, however, and so as to maintain its valid-ity, if possible... 
. By it the respondents establish the principle of collective
bargaining, obtain the closed shop, 44 hour week, extra rates of pay for over-
time, and their own working conditions, all that union labor, so far, has ever
contended for. I think the contract is valid, and imposes the reciprocal obliga-
tion on respondents to work according to the contract in good faith. There is
no doubt the action of the men was arbitrary and amounted to a breach of the
contract"
'Our law now recognizes a contract right as property Which is to be protected
against undue interference by persons not parties to the contract. When a thirdparty intentionally, by the use of any kind of means, causes a breach of the con-
tract involving damage, he is prima facie guilty of a tort." Booth & Bros. v.
Burgess (igo6) 72,XN. J. Eq. 18i, 65 At. 226. For a discussion of the use ofpersuasion to induce a person to refrain from contracting, 
-see Smith, Crucial
Issues in Labor Litigation (i9o7) 2o HARV. L REv. 253, 266.4Morgan, v. Andrews (1895) 107 Mich. 33, 64 N. W. 869; Doremus v. Hen-
nessy (I898) 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924; Beekman v. Marsters (igop7) 195 Mass
2o5, go N. E. 8x7.
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cases from .further discussion. This action by a third person may be
of importance in labor litigation either: (i) by causing a breach of con-
tract for personal services; or (2) by causing a breach of a trade
contract.5
A breach of contract for personal services may be procured ot
brought about by a third party in one of two ways: F (outsiders, gen-
erally other unions) may induce A (a group of laborers) to strike in
violation of their contract with B; or A (union employees of B) may,
by threat of a strike, compel B to discharge C. Thus a third person is
interfering through the employer or employee. 6 The first* question to
be answered is whether a contract has in fact been broken. This can
be determined only by analyzing the actual relationship between B and
C. There may be a definite contract of employment between the two,
but very seldom is that the case. It is *true that wherever C is in B's
employ, this relationship is often called a contract of employment. But
it is submitted that there is often no effective contract at all between
them, or at most there is only a contract from day to day or from week
to week. Upon analysis it may be seen that in many instances B
merely makes to C an offer to pay him a stated wage per day. C
accepts this offer by working. Thus a unilateral contract comes into
existence-B being under a duty to pay C the amount stipulated for
the work done. Consequently the only breach of a contract' possible is
in case B should refuse to pay C. Thus any inducement brought to
bear on B or C to terminate the employment at the end of the day can
accomplish but two things-a withdrawal of B's offer or a rejection of
the offer by C. Neither of the parties is under a contractual duty as
to succeeding days and consequently no third person can induce a
breach thereof. There is, of course, a certain interest in fact involved,
which the courts protect to a limited extent. They have created the
right to a free flow of labor, as explained previously; but this is quite
different from a right that one who has already contracted shall not be
induced to commit a breach.7
The general view is to consider that the same rules are applicable to both
cases. Beekman v. Mfarsters, supra. There is a minority doctrine, however, that
holds that there is no liability in the latter case: Ashley v. Dixon (1872) 48
N. Y. 430 (see discussion of this case in Posner Co. v. Jackson (1918) 223 N. Y.
325, 119 E. 573) ; .Boyson v. Thorn .(1893) 96 Calif. 578, 33 Pac. 492.
"That the interest of an employer or an employee in a contract for services is
property is conceded. Where defendants in combination or individually under-
take to interfere with and disrupt existing contractual relations between the
employer and the employee, it is plain that a property right is directly invaded."
Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy (igo2) 63 N. 3. Eq. 759, 53 Atl. 230. An
excellent discussion as to what constitutes justification ,is to be found in Glar-
organ Coal v. South Wales Miners Federation [i9o3] 2 K. B. 545.
"A large part of what is most valuable in modern life seems to depend more or
less directly upon 'probable expectancies.' When they fail, civilization as at
present organized, may go down. As social and industrial life develops and
grows more complex these 'probable expectancies' are bound to increase. It
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Despite the fact in the case put there is no contractual relation
between B and C, some courts are inclined to treat it substantially as if
there were. This is doubtless due to the origin of this kind of action.
Originally its basis was in tort for the seduction of C, causing a loss of
C's services to B. Even though this seduction theory is properly
exploded, there seems to be a vestige of it still remaining in the minds
of the courts.8
The other important situation is that which involves the breach of a
trade contract.9 Thus A may strike against B to compel B to cease
would seem to be inevitable that courts of law, as our system of jurisprudence is
evolved to meet the growing wants of an increasingly complex social order, will
discover, define and protect from undue interference more of these 'probable
expectancies."' Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, supra. It may be observed,
however, that an express contract also creates that sensation called a "probable
expectancy." In both classes of cases alike the question is as to whether there
exist rights in rem; that third persons shall not cause disappointment in the ful-
filment of reasonable expectations.
'The history of this remedy is discussed in Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor
Blosser.Co. (i9o5) ia Ga. 5og, So S. E. 353. The court then sums up its opinion
in this manner. "In the case at bar the relation of master and servant did exist
between the plaintiff and his employees, and even applying the common-law rule
of liability, the defendants would be answerable in damages to the plaintiff for
a malicious procurement of the breach of contract by its employees. The term
'malicious,' used in this connection, is to be given a liberal meaning. The act is
malicious when the thing done is with the knowledge of the plaintiff's rights, and
with the intent to interfere therewith. It is a wanton interfere ice with another's
contractual rights."
In Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke (9o6) 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S. E. i6i, the court
said: "A party cannot have a justifiable cause to instigate, to move, the breach
of a contract between master and servant.. , . When his action, with know'l-
edge on his part of a contract, causes, by intention, a breach of that contract, he
is liable to damages, even though he acts for the promotion of his own interest."
While this court recognizes that there is actually no contract in existence, yet
"it is a subsisting contract between the company and its servants in process of
execution." Obviously this is merely an expectancyr that C will continue to
work, and is an expectancy and not a contract, and should be treated as such.
In principle, there seems to -be no difference from the situation where X has
bought from Y's store for years, and Z suddenly induced him to stop buying. A
contract would have resulted, but any interference by Z is merely interference
with an expectancy. The court, however, would imply a contract-"by'the
language used in the books a contract must exist. This count says the miners
were 'employed' by the plaintiff and in actual service. Now, if the law gives
action for enticement of a servant, it is not conceivable that a third person can
maliciously entice away a lot of employees, simply because there was no Contract
fixing term of service. The relation of master and servant exists. In such case
there is a contract recognized by law, a'n implied contract by which the employee
can recover for his service. By entering such service the employee agrees,
contracts to work-"
"A right of action against a third party for enticing one party to breach its
contracts with another is universally recognized .... The principle is also equally
applicable whether the contract is at.will or otherwise." Third Ave. Ry. v. Shea(igM, Sup. Ct.) 109 Misc. i8, i79 N. Y. Supp. 43; Lamb v. Cheney "& Son (1920)
227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 8x7.'
'As shown in note 5, this is not considered a tort in some jurisdictions.
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dealing with D, B having a contract of purchase or sale with D. This
is of frequent occurrence at the present time, and presents a question of
considerable difficulty. There is here a clear case of a third person
procuring a breach of contract. The courts which hold this to be a
tort are disposed to be more liberal in finding a justification than
where there is a procurement of a breach of contract of service.10
This liberality is based on economic reasons. Since the mores have
permitted an extension of the privilege to strike, and since most com-
mercial transactions are in contract form, the only way to give effect to
such broader liberty of action by employees is to qualify the doctrine
that interference by a third person with contractual obligations is
actionable.
There still remain various situations involving contractual obliga-
tions which are not included in the preceding general classification. A
few of these may be discussed briefly. A case of not infrequent occur-
rence is that in which A is under a contract with B not to join a union.
or to do or refrain from some similar act not in the nature of personal
service. X (union organizer) attempts to unionize A in violation of
this contract: The general rule is to hold that B has a cause of action
against X.21
Another situation of frequent occurrence is that in which A strikes
against B, because of some dispute involving only these two parties,.but
D suffers a loss because B is now unable to carry out his contract
with D, and supply him with goods, for instance. Since A's acts are
not for the purpose of injuring D, and this is an incidental damage, it
seems that the mere existence between B and D should not give a right
to D as against A: yet D is sometimes given a remedy.12 An even
" "The law is pretty thoroughly settled both in England and in this country
that causing another to violate his contract with a third party, without a legal
justification, is an actionable injury, from which it follows that if the defendants
[A] by sending the notices to the contractors caused some of them to break their
contracts, and did so maliciously and without justification, they made themselves
liable at least to an action for damages. But I do not think it can be said that the
sending of the notices was without justification. . . . If this is so-if the notice
to the contractors [B] was proper and essential to fair dealing, as between them
and the plaintiff [Cl-the fact that some of them violated their existing contracts
cannot be deemed a wrong caused by the def endants." Parkinson Co. v. Building
Trades Council (ibo8) 154 Calif. 581, 98 Pac. io27; Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v.
Bricklayers' Union (1917) 92 Conn. 161, ioI Atl. 659.
'Flaccus v. Smith (i9ox) 199 Pa. 128, 48 Atl. 894. Callan 'v. Exposition Cotton
Aills (1919) 149 Ga. 11g, 99 S. E. 3oo. Many courts simply put these cases on
the ground of an unjustified interference with B's business without regard to
the question whether it is an interference with contractual obligation. Hitch-
man. Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65. Cf.
Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (1920, Ky.) 222 S. W. io7g.
' "We find the complainant (D) to be in the position of one seeking to pre-
serve his contract with another from impairment through the unlawful acts of a
third person, stranger both to the contract and to the affairs of either party
thereto. There can be no distinction in principle between a right of action
founded on an attempt to induce a breach of contract and an attempt by force
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stronger case than this, is where A strikes against B to have C dis-
charged, and B has A restrained* because A's acts would cause B to
violate his contract with D.18
The chief difficulty, however, in cases of violation of contract rights
in labor cases-in fact in almost any case involving a labor dispute-is
the problem of remedies. Obviously the natural and ordinary remedy
would be to compel A to work by means of a mandatory injunction.
This, however, is opposed to our present mores. It is thus impossible
to compel A to work.' 4 Where a strike is held to be illegal, the usual
remedy is to enjoin the officers of the union from calling and aiding the
said strike, and from paying strike benefits, etc.15
The use of the injunction is in this way partly successful, but does not
always prevent a continuance of a strike. In addition to this, there
may be considerable harm suffered before the injunction is obtained.
Thus it seems that damages are often necessary in addition to an injunc-
tion (if an injunction can be had), but here, too, damages are ineffec-
tive where the harm is irreparable. The present tendency of the
courts and of legislation seems to be to award damages instead of
injunctive relief.'6 There is a further difficulty resulting from the fact
that labor unions are often unincorporated and loose associations. Yet
or violence to bring about the same results. From the authorities referred to,it seems clear that a right of action between the complainant 
-and the defendants,
who are alleged to be fomenting a strike by violence, is stated in the bill, one
which is independent of any right of action in the Overland, which was not,therefore, an indispensable or even a necessary- party." Dail-Overland Co. V.Willys-Overland (919, N. D. Ohio) 263 Fed. I7i. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v.Iron Moulders' Union (1917,. S. D. Ohio) 246 Fed. 8.5; Carroll v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Coal Co. (I9O3, C. C. A. 4th) 124 Fed. 3o5.
'Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron (i9o7) 194 Mass. 208, 8D N.-E. 478.
"This is well brought out in the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Arthur v.
Oakes (1894, C. C. A. 7th) 63 Fed. 310, "It would be an invasion of one's ngt-
ur41 liberty to compel him [A] to work for or to remain in the personal service
of another. One who is.placed under such constraint is in a condition of invol-
untary servitude,-- a condition which the supreme law of the land declares shall
not. exist within the United States, or in any .place subject to their jurisdic-
tion.... The rule, we think, is .without exception that equity will not compel the
actual performance by an employ6 of merely personal services any more than it
will compel an employer to retain in his personal service one who, no matter for
what cause, is not acceptable to him for services of that character." See, how-
ever, the case of Toledo Railroad Co. v. Pa. Co. -(1893, N. D' -Ohio) 54 Fed. 746,
affirmed in Ex parte Termon (1897) 166 U. S. 548, 17 "Sup. Ct. 658, where an
employee remaining in, employment, was adjudged in contempt of court for
refusing to perform acts specified in the injunction.
"5 The effect of statutes prohibiting injunctions in labor disputes and other labor
legislation will be discussed in a later comment.
"Barnes v. Berry (19q7 S. D. Ohio) i56 Fed. 72; Purvis v. United Brother-hood (19o6) 214 Pa. 349, 63 Atl. 585; Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle (i9o8)215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997. Of course an injunction may be had against illegal
means, such as violence, intimidation, or fraud. See Comma~yrs (i921) 30 YALE
LAw JOURNrAL., 404.
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in a number of recent cases courts have granted relief against such an
association of employees whether incorporated or not."
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND STATES' RIGHTS
In Gilbert v. Minnesota (1920) 41 Sup. Ct. 125, the question of free-
dom of speech was presented to the federal Supreme Court from a new
angle. The issue was the constitutionality of a state statute making
unlawful any advocacy against enlistment in the federal military or
naval forces or against aiding the United States in the prosecution of
war. This question is of great importance, in view of the number and
drastic character of state sedition laws passed as a result of the World
War, many of them after the Armistice.' It raises primarily the issue
of conflicting state and federal powers. The issue of freedom of
speech was, however, directly raised, since Justice Brandeis, dissent-
ing,2 held that freedom of speech was a "privilege or immunity" of
a United States citizen within the terms of the constitutional protection,
and was also a "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without
due process of law. The majority did not decide the point further
than to hold that Gilbert's conviction would not violate such constitu-
tional guarantees.of freedom of speech if they existed.8 The opinion
"St. Germain v. Bakery Workers' Union (1917) 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665;
Michael v. Hillman (1920) 112 Misc.'395, 183 N. Y. Supp. x95. Where there is a
strict observance of the common-law rules, however, it is necessary to sue the
individuals composing the association. An excellent discussion of this question
is to be found in St. Paul Typothetae v. Book-binders' Union (igo5) 94 Minn. 351,
io2 N. W. 725. That a voluntary association (i. e. unincorporated) is liable for
punitive damages, see Clarkson v. Laiblan (1919, Mo.) 216 S. W. io2g. The court
held the association liable for the wrongful acts of its officers acting within
authority. For opposing view see Michaels v. Hillnan (192o, Sup. Ct.) 112 Misc.
395, 183 N. Y. Supp. 195.
'These are collected in Chafee, Freedom of Speech (192o) Appendix V,
399-4o5. For comment on the Connecticut statutes of i919, see (Ig) 29 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, io8. The Minnesota statute in question (Laws 1917, ch. 463)
is not limited to the period of war and makes unlawful any kind of teaching
against enlistment. Even this was not sufficiently drastic, and hence in 8919
(Laws I919 ch. 93) it was strengthened and the usual maximum penalty of
twenty years' imprigonment was incorporated. The latter act seems, however,
to be limited to the time of war.
'The majority opinion was by Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Holmes
concurring in the result. Chief Justice White dissented on the ground that
after Congress had passed the Espionage Act, there was no further room for
state action. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented for similar reasons and also for the
reason stated in the text.
'Quoting inter alia from Schenck v. United States (1919) 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup.
Ct. 247. But in that case the entire court agreed that the words used must be
used in such circumstances and be of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress may
prevent. See (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337. This case has never been over-
ruled. A recent application of this test to set aside a conviction under the fed-
eral Act appears in Beck v. United States (920, C. C. A. 7th) 268 Fed. 195 (con-
viction of a native born citizen, for twenty years a county judge, because at a
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betrays no small trace of war emotion.4
On the issue of sovereignty it is perhaps surprising to find that a
majority of a court generally so federalistic in its views 5 felt that a
state might constitutionally circumscribe the discussion of national
problems even after Congress had legislated upon the subject. Their
reasons are of interest. They considered that any other view must be
based upon a theory that there is something antagonistic betwhen citi-
zenship in a state and citizenship in the United States. Repudiating
this theory, they held that the interests of the United States are also
those of a state and may be cherished and fostered by that state.
Hence if a state is not satisfied with a federal sentence of twenty years
against an agitator, it may add a like sentence of its own. One may
admit all but the conclusion and yet doubt how this settles the ques-
tion as-to which sovereignty shall control the subject. Again the court
suggested that the state statute might be upheld as a simple exercise of
the state police power to preserve the peace. Certainly every state must
and does have such power; in fact it would seem that this should be
the limit of its power to restrict the discussion of national issues.
But a statute making it unlawful to interfere with the enlistment of men
in the military or naval service of the United States is surely more than
a mere police regulation designed to quell disorder. Hence Chief Jus-
tice White would seem properly to have dissented on the ground that
after Congress passed the Espionage Act-which was prior to the occa-
meeting called to reorganize the county council of defense he had made what
one hostile witness thought was an economic and another a patriotic address
in criticism of the calling together of the county board). See also Erhardt v.
United States (192o, C. C. A. 7th) 268 Fed. 326, reversing a conviction for
words claimed to have been spoken at a neighborhood party nearly three months
before defendant's arrest.
'Gilbert, an official of the Non-Partisan League, was convicted for a speech
in which he attacked the democracy of America, saying-that we had better make
America safe for democracy first and asking his hearers if they had had any-
thing to say as to who should .be President or as to whether we should go into
the war, and that we should have voted on conscription and were stampeded into
the war to pull England's chestnuts out of the fire. Unless this does so, there
was -no advocacy against enlistment or against prosecution of the war. Mr.
Justice McKenna says that "every word" uttered by Gilbert in denunciation of the
war was false and was deliberate misrepresentation and that "he could have had
no purpose other than that of which he was charged." In this connection and
as bearing on Gilbert's purposes, one should bear in mind the claims made for
the League that it is conducting a struggle for the agrarian interests against large
financial and business interests. See criticism of the case by Professor Chafee
in (I92i) 25 NEW REPUBLIC, 259. At the trial Gilbert had. denied the speaking
of the words in question. (I918) 141 Minn. 263, 169 N. W. 790. In State V.
Mlartin (x918) 142 Minn. 484 169 N. W. 792, the majority at first upheld a
conviction of a defendant for approving Gilbert's speech in -the course of a
barber shop altercation, but on August 1, 19g, amajority of the court de~ided
that the issues should be submitted to a new jury.
Witness for example its decisions as to the inapplicability of state workmen's
compensation acts to injuries occurring in harbors. See (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 925, collecting previous notes in the JOURAL.
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sion when Gilbert made the speech in question-no further power in
this field remained in the states. So Justice Brandeis, holding that such
power was exclusively in the federal government, pointed out how a
state by severely repressive measures might hamper the federal prose-
cution of war, and quoted an official of the Department of Justice to
the effect that the Minnesota policy was a cause of real embarrassment
and danger to the federal government.
6 Inasmuch as most of the state
statutes, unlike the federal Espionage Act, are not limited to a time of
war, it may be added that a state, under such a condition of affairs as
existed from 1915 until our entrance into -the war, might easily force
the hands of the federal government by stern repression of the sym-
pathizers with one of the belligerents.
s
There is, however, a suggestion, explicit in the Gilbert Case and
implicit in. all those in accord with it, which gives ground for a possible
explanation. That suggestion is that the action of the state must be
one of co-operation with the federal government. Herein may lie an
opportunity for the avoidance of danger. During the recent crisis the
government showed beyond the possibility. of a doubt its hostility to
criticism, and state repressive statutes were plainly in co-operation with
the federal policy. Under a government more amenable to public
opinion Gilbert v. Minnesota need not be a precedent to hamper the
execution of federal policies. C.E.C.
DEPORTATION OF ALIEN COMMUNISTS
The Act of Congress of October i6, 1918, provides ihat aliens who
are members of, or afiliated with, any organization that entertains a
belief in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of
the Government of the United States may be deported.' This statute
aJohn Lord O'Brian, Civil.Liberty in War-Time (igig) 42 N. Y. State Bar
Asso. Rep. 275, 296.
See note i, supra.
"Decisions of inferior tribunals on this subject seem for the most part in
accord with the principal case. See State v. Holm (igi8) 139 Minn. 267, i66
N. W. 181, L. R. A. i918 C, 3o4, with note giving the few analogous precedents
prior to the war. A fairly complete picture is given by the majority and minority
opinions in State v. Tachin (I919, Sup. Ct.). 9 N. J. L. 269, io6 Ati. x45, (igig)
93 N. J. L. 485, xo8 Ati. 318. See also State v. Gibson (igig, Iowa) 174 N. W.
34. Contra, Ex parte Meckel (192o, Tex. Cr. App.) 22o S. W. 8i. In Er parte
Starr (i92o, D. Mont.) 263 Fed. 145, the Montana act was upheld for the period
prior to the passage of the federal Espionage Law, although Judge Bourquin
strongly condemned the act. See (192D) 29 YALE LAW JOURNA., 936. Mr.
Justice McKenna cites the Minnesota decision upholding state bonuses to veter-
ans. Gustavson v. Rhinow (i92o) 144 Minn. 415, i75 N. W. 903. This point
is not, however, beyond controversy. See (192o) 29 YArx LAw JouRNAI, 69o;
(920) 33 HAkv. L. RPv. 846; (192o) z8 MIcH. L. REv. 535; (920) 4 MINN. L.
REV. 233. Cfi as to state soldiers' civil relief acts, Konkel v. State (i919) 168
Wis. 335, 17o N. W..715; cf. also State v. Darwin (igi8) io2 Wash. 402, 173
Pac. 29.
'U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. I919, sec. 42891/4b (i) and sec. 4289T/4 b (2).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
has received judicial consideration in two United States District Court
decisions; the aliens involved being some of those taken in the raids of
January 2, 1920, and following.2 As the opinions in these cases cannot
be harmonized, the question awaits the determination of the Supreme
Court. Other aliens are being deported under this statute on the
authority of the Secretary of Labor, who is giving the statute a far
reaching application.3
In the Massachusetts District, Judge Anderson held that the mere
fact that an-alien was a professedly active member of the Communist
Party of America was not sufficient grounds for his deportation. The
theory of his decision is that the end of that party is radically to change
our government, but not to overthrow it; and further, that the means
advocated in their manifesto and programme to accomplish this end is
not the use of force or violence but only the use of the general strik6.
"Force or violence" he interprets to mean the use of bombs and
weapons for the destruction of life and property. Judge Knox, in the
Abern Case, on the other hand, holds that the clear import of the Com-
munist literature is that the party does advocate the destruction of life
and property. The Communists advocate the expropriation of private
property, and Judge Knox contends that, as the officers of the present
government are charged with the protection of property rights, these
officers, as well as the property owners, would necessarily employ force
to protect those rights. The Communists would then use such force
as would be necessary for the achievement of their success. The prob-
lem thus seems to raise three questions. Would the expropriation of
private property mean the overthrow of our government? Is the use
of the general strike the use of force or violence? Assuming that the
general strike is.not the use of force or violence, do the Communists
urge the use of force or violence as incidental to, or in addition to, the
ise of the strike?
The promulgation of political views by the use of force or violence
is subversive of democratic government. The use of the general strike
is very close to the use of force and violence. Whether it is a legiti-
mate means is a question of policy. The policy of our government has
always been to encourage immigration, as Judge Anderson points out.
We also have highly regarded our freedom of speech and press, and it
is questionable policy to attempt to combat radicalism by penalizing
mere opinion.4 These deportations may perhaps be legally sustained;
but it seems the better policy to limit the operation of this statute to
cases clearly within its provisions.
'Colyer v. Skefflngton (192o, D. Mass.) 265 Fed. 17; United States v. Wallis
(092o, S. D. N. Y.) 268 Fed. 413.
a That the Secretary of Labor proposes to enforce this statute extensively may
well be inferred from his opinion in the recent case of the deportation of
Martens, the "Soviet Ambassador." See the NEW YORK TIMlEs, Dec. 17, 192o.
"See (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 561; Noms (1920) 2o CoL- L. REv. 680.
